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COMMENT
PROPERTY -EMINENT DOMAIN-Trespass or Inverse
Condemnation:
Election of Remedies for Uncompensated Appropriation of Land
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).
INTRODUCTION

Inverse condemnation is a remedy available to an owner
whose property has been appropriated for a public use without
condemnation proceedings or the payment of compensation.' Initiated by the landowner rather than the condemnor, inverse condemnation is treated as if it were an eminent domain proceeding.2
Both actions follow statutory rules, but inverse condemnation is
commenced after the land is taken while eminent domain proceedings are initiated before the land is appropriated.3 The same
rules apply in both actions and the same issues, including
whether the taking is necessary and proper, are litigated.4
I Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 511 P.2d 517 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974). In Ossman the court of appeals defines
inverse condemnation as
an action brought by a property owner seeking just compensation for land
taken for a public use, against a government or private entity having the
power of eminent domain. [citations omitted]. It is a remedy peculiar to the
property owner, and is exercisable by the property owner where it appears
that the taker of the property does not intend to bring eminent domain
proceedings. The doctrine rests upon the theory that after property has been
devoted to public use by a condemnor, and public policy dictates that such
use should not be discontinued, the property owner is entitled to compensation.
511 P.2d at 519, citing Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39
Cal. Rptr. 903 (1964); Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough, 245 Cal. App. 2d 324, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (1966); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964). For a
discussion of alternative remedies available to the uncompensated landowner-such as
injunction, mandamus, ejectment, tort, implied contract, and constitutional provisions-see Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated
Landowner, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 210.
1Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974); Stuart v.
Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152 (1916).
,Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974). See also
Stalford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 128 Colo. 441, 263 P.2d 436 (1953); Boxberger v.
Highway Comm., 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920 (1952); Swift v. Smith, 119 Colo. 126, 201
P.2d 609 (1948).
San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Noffsinger, 85 Colo. 202, 274 P. 827 (1929). For a
discussion of the elements of an inverse condemnation action and the proper procedures
to be followed, see Feder & Wieland, Inverse Condemnation-A Viable Alternative, 51
DENVER L.J. 529 (1974).
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In Colorado, owners seeking compensation for appropriated
land have had little success basing their action on a common law
theory.5 Actions based on different theories have in the past been
treated as if they were actually inverse condemnation suits.' This
exclusiveness, however, has rarely worked a hardship. Based on
the constitutional provision that "[pirivate property shall not be
taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation," 7 Colorado statutes8 and case law9 have usually provided
effective relief in the form of inverse condemnation.
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has recently held
that inverse condemnation is not the sole remedy available. In
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"0 the
court sanctioned trespass as an alternative remedy. The landowner may now elect to sue in trespass rather than inverse condemnation when a trespasser having the power of eminent domain refuses to initiate condemnation proceedings. This comment examines the factors to be considered in making an election
between the now available remedies and then assesses the impact
Ossman may have.
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
In July of 1967 while placing a telephone cable alongside a
highway right-of-way, defendant Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. laid part of its cable on land owned by the plaintiff
Emett Ossman. In doing so, defendant severed approximately
one-half acre from the rest of the plaintiff's tract. In June 1970,
when Ossman discovered what had happened, he immediately
contacted the defendant and demanded compensation of $1,000.
Subsequent negotiations between the parties as to the amount of
compensation proved fruitless when the defendant refused to increase its original offer of $42 for the land. After unsuccessfully
I.

5 See, e.g., Snowden v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 238 F. 495 (8th Cir. 1916); Sanger v.
Larson Constr. Co., 126 Colo. 479, 251 P.2d 930 (1952); Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo.
58, 156 P. 152 (1916); Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Doelz, 49 Colo. 48, 111 P. 595 (1910); Edwards
v. Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 114 P. 856 (1914).
1 In an early Colorado case the court said that an owner's suit for damages caused
by the appropriation of land is "akin to condemnation suits" and is to "be tried like a
condemnation suit." Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 70, 156 P. 152, 156 (1916).
COLO. CONST. art. I, § 15.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101 (1973).
Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974); Board of
Comm'rs v. Adler, 16 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621 (1920).
10 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).
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requesting the defendant to condemn the land, the plaintiff
commenced an action in trespass.
In his complaint, Ossman sought damages for the trespass
and exemplary damages for defendant's wanton and reckless disregard of his rights and feelings. Mountain Bell pleaded as an
affirmative defense that Ossman was limited to the damages he
could recover in inverse condemnation. The trial court combined
the two theories by "instructing that a trespass existed as a matter of law, and by awarding the title to the land to Mountain Bell
"" Ossman received $1,942 for the easement and damage
...
to the residue of his land and $2,308 in exemplary damages.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court 2 by
holding that an entity possessed of the powers of eminent domain,
"if pursuing a public purpose (Colo. Const. Art. II § 15) cannot
be a trespasser.' 3 The proper remedy, the court said, was to treat
the defendant's counterclaim for inverse condemnation as a petition for eminent domain" and, upon request of the parties, the
trial court should then have
conducted an in limine hearing to determine if the taking was necessary and proper. If the in limine hearing resulted in a determination
that it was not necessary and proper, then plaintiff's trespass action
could be maintained, and trespass damages, not condemnation
damages, would be awarded. No transfer of title to the land taken

or easement would result."

Only if it were determined that the land could not properly be
condemned, the court of appeals held, could the plaintiff's trespass action be successfully maintained.
1 511 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
12 Id.
'3

Id. at 519. The court said that
[b]y our ruling, a trespass remedy would be available to [the landowner]
only if it were determined that [the condemnor] had no right under the
Constitution or eminent domain statutes to take private property, or that the
specific taking was unauthorized or unlawful.

Id.
14This petition, found in CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-102 (1973) applies,
[iun all cases where the right to take private property for public or private
use without the owner's consent or the right to construct or maintain any
. . . public or private work which may damage property not actually taken
is conferred by general laws or special charter upon any corporate or municipal authority. ...
Mountain Bell is conferred this authority as a "corporation ... seeking to secure a right... Id. § 38-5-107.
of-way for lines of telegraph, [and] telephone.
11511 P.2d at 520 (emphasis added).
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The Colorado Supreme Court reversed both lower courts."6 It
held that a landowner had the "right to elect to sue in trespass
under the circumstances" in this case and that there was "no
sound reason why a landowner should be limited to an inverse
condemnation remedy where a trespasserrefuses to promptly initiate eminent domain proceedings."'7 The court ruled that if the
landowner elected to pursue his trespass claim the issue of
exemplary damages, as well as any special damages, would be
submitted to the jury. The court explicitly held, however, that
trespass and inverse condemnation could not be maintained in
the same action because the latter, a special statutory remedy,
had features inconsistent with a common law action.' 8 Therefore,
the landowner must elect at the outset either trespass or inverse
condemnation.

II.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

The landowner's decision to elect trespass or inverse condemnation depends on factors that bar one remedy-such as sovereign immunity, acquiescence to the entry, or the statute of limitations-and differences between the nature and measure of damages of the two remedies that make one more attractive than the
other in a particular situation.
A.

Involuntary Election

1. Sovereign Immunity
If the appropriating entity is a governmental body, sovereign
immunity may bar tort recovery and limit the landowner to inverse condemnation. 9 The Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act 20 affects suits brought against an entity that is any "kind of
'

520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).

'I

Id. at 741 (emphasis added). As support for this statement, the supreme court

cited, inter alia, Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921);
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Hayes, 49 Colo. 333, 112 P. 315 (1911); Denver & S.F. Ry. v.
School Dist. No. 2, 14 Colo. 327, 23 P. 978 (1890).
IS Among the differences the court pointed out in the two actions were the common
law origin of trespass and the constitutional origin of inverse condemnation; the award of
exemplary damages in trespass under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (1973) that are
not recoverable in inverse condemnation; and the statutory rules, found in CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1-101 to -7-107 (1973), governing inverse condemnation that are not
applicable to trespass. 520 P.2d at 741-42.
" This comment is concerned only with appropriations made by state entities and
not with federal bodies whose liability is governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-80
(1970). See Feder & Wieland, supra note 4, 537-38.
'" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-101 to -117 (1973).
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district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of the
state organized pursuant to law"'" and this immunity extends to
"liability in all claims for injury which are actionable in tort. ' 2
The presence of the eminent domain statute is neither a waiver
of this immunity nor a consent to be sued in tort. 23 Thus, sovereign immunity could be asserted as a defense against a landowner
bringing an action in trespass.24 In contrast, the right of eminent
domain is based on the "takings clause" of the Colorado constitution and as this is the constitutional provision upon which inverse
condemnation is based, an action in inverse condemnation is not
subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. 5
Governmental bodies, however, are not the only entities having the power of eminent domain. The use of public rights-ofways is given to "[any domestic or foreign telegraph, telephone,
electric light power, gas, or pipeline company, authorized to do
business under the laws" of Colorado. In addition, these companies are "vested with the power of eminent domain, and authorized to proceed to obtain rights-of-way for poles, wires, pipes,
regulator stations, substations, and systems for such purposes
§ 24-10-103(5).
Id. § 24-10-106(1).
2 Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court of the United States, 207 F.2d 50 (10th
Cir. 1953).
1, The defense of sovereign immunity, however, may be waived by COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 24-10-104(1) (1973) which provides waiver
if a public entity provides insurance coverage . . . to insure itself against
liability for any injury or to insure any of its employees against his liability
for any injury resulting from an act or omission by such employee acting
within the scope of his employment ....
The liability resulting from this waiver is limited to "the amount of the insurance coverage
and shall be recovered from the insurer only." Id. § 24-10-104(2). See also id. § 24-10-116
which provides when the State is required to obtain insurance.
" CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15. Colorado courts have awarded damages caused by the
taking of property not ordinarily compensable in eminent domain proceedings and have
based recovery not on tort or common law theories, but rather on the "takings clause."
See, e.g., Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Boxberger v. State Highway
Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); Board of Comm'rs v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194
P. 621 (1920); City of Colorado Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 P. 794 (1914); cf.
Hayutin v. Colorado State Dep't of Highways, 175 Colo. 83, 485 P.2d 896, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971); Troiano v. Department of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448
(1969). See also Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: Prescriptionfor
Regression, 49 DENVER L.J. 567 (1973), which argues that the exceptions to the sovereign
immunity barrier in these types of cases are based on the unconstitutionality of the
uncompensated taking of the property. For a further discussion of the use of inverse
condemnation as a means of avoiding the sovereign immunity barrier, see Oberst & Lewis,
Claims Against the State of Kentucky-Reverse Eminent Domain, 42 Ky. L.J. 163 (1953).
2' COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-101 (1973).
21 Id.
2
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" These companies, moreover, are liable for their torts and
...
are not protected by any statute. 8 Sovereign immunity, then,
does not bar common law actions, such as trespass, that a
landowner may elect to pursue against nongovernmental entities
appropriating land.
2. Acquiescence to the Entry
Acquiescence occurs when a landowner knows an entity with
the power of eminent domain has appropriated his land and he
does nothing to assert his right to the land.29 If a landowner allows
entry without demanding compensation 0 or requiring the initiation of condemnation proceedings 3 or if he simply does not interfere with the entry, 2 he will be held to have acquiesced. The effect
of acquiescence is to bar tort recovery and limit the damages to
the amount recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding.3 This
limitation of damages applies even if the person who acquiesces
34
to the entry was a previous owner rather than the present one.
Therefore, unless a landowner protests the presence on his land
of an entity with the power of eminent domain from the entry,
35
he will have acquiesced and be limited to inverse condemnation.

3. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations bars recovery for actions not
commenced within the statutory period after the cause of action
accrues. For damages resulting from a permanent trespass, such
as the construction of a building or the appropriation of an easement, recovery may be had only "for the injury done up to the
commencement of the suit." The cause of action accrues when
" Id. § 38-5-105. See also CoLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 which provides eminent domain
powers for the conveyance of water over private land.
2 See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sanger, 87 Colo. 369, 287 P. 866
(1930); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eyser, 2 Colo. 141 (1873); Wertz v. Holy Cross Elec.
Ass'n, 512 P.2d 286 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
" See generally Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152 (1916).
10Edwards v. Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 144 P. 856 (1914).
31 Snowden v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 238 F. 495 (8th Cir. 1916).
12 Rogers v. Lower Clear Creek Ditch Co., 63 Colo. 216, 165 P. 248 (1917).
3 See, e.g., cases cited in note 5 supra.
11Edwards v. Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 144 P. 856 (1914).
3
For an example of a case in which the landowner was held not to have acquiesced
because he protested from the beginning the presence of a trespasser with the powers of
eminent domain, see Denver & S.F. Ry. v. School Dist. No. 2, 14 Colo. 327, 23 P. 978
(1890).
31 City & County of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 127, 2 P. 6, 15 (1883). In Denver
City Irrigation & Water Co. v. Middaugh, 12 Colo. 434, 21 P. 565 (1889), the court said
that
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the damage first becomes apparent37 and the injured party's right
to bring an action is then limited by the 6-year tort statute of
limitations.3 If he fails to bring it within that time he will be
forced to use inverse condemnation, which has an 18-year statute
of limitations. 9
If the landowner fails to claim potential damages in a condemnation suit, then the 6-year tort statute of limitations might
bar all actions for additional damage to the land that are not
brought within that period. In Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v.
Majors,"0 the defendant condemned land for a canal bed running
through plaintiff's property to drain water from its reservoir. One
year when doing so it damaged plaintiff's property by letting too
much water flow through the canal and plaintiff sought damages
for the injury to his land. The court refused to allow him any
damages, holding that the original condemnation award had fully
compensated him and that the tort
statute of limitations applies to actions for damages where parties,
having the power of eminent domain take possession of land and use
it, with the knowledge of the owner, and he neglects to enjoin them
or fails to bring suit for damages within such statutory period
41

Therefore, the plaintiff was barred from recovering anything for
the additional damage to his land.
B.

Voluntary Election
A landowner whose choice is not precluded by sovereign

as to trespasses and nuisances that are not of a permanent character, damages can only be recovered for the injury sustained up to the time of the
commencement of the suit, but as to trespasses and nuisances that are of a
permanent character, a single recovery may be had for the whole damage
resulting from the act.
12 Colo. at 444, 21 P. at 569 (dictum). See note 53 infra.
11Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921); Middelkamp
v. Bessemer Irrigating Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909). In Middelkamp the court said
that "the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the lands were first visibly
affected.
...
46 Colo. at 113, 103 P. at 283.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-110(e) (1973).
31Id. § 38-41-101(1) provides that after 18 years "[n]o person shall commence or
maintain an action for the recovery of the title or possession or to enforce or establish any
right or interest of or to real property ....
0 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921).
" Id. at 593, 196 P. at 335, citing Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152
(1916); Middelkamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909); Denver
& S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122, 95 P. 343 (1908). For further discussion of the use
of statute of limitations as a defense to claims for the uncompensated appropriation of
land, see Feder & Wieland, supra note 4, at 541.
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immunity, acquiescence, or the running of the statute of limitations is in the position of being able to elect trespass or inverse
condemnation. The primary consideration involved in making
this decision is the difference in damages the two remedies offer
that makes one more advantageous than the other.
1. Inverse Condemnation
In determining the "respective rights of plaintiff and defendant as to property taken, damages and benefits," the same rules
apply in inverse condemnation as apply in eminent domain. 2 The
measure of damages is the fair market value of the property 3 and,
in addition to this amount, the recovery of "damages, if any, to
the residue of such property" may be had." Against this, the
defendant may set off any improvements that specifically benefit
the land,45 although general benefits to the community at large
cannot be set off."
2. Trespass
In trespass the measure of damages is the difference in the
value of the land immediately before and immediately after the
injury." Where it will not accurately reflect the actual damages
suffered, this rule is not invariably applied. In such cases, other
evidence may be admitted.48 Exemplary damages can also be
recovered if the defendant acts in "wanton and reckless disregard
1

San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Noffsinger, 85 Colo. 202, 207, 274 P. 827, 829

(1929).
"
The fair market value of the property was described in Wassenich v. City & County
of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 466, 186 P. 533, 537 (1919) to be the price the "property would
bring if sold in the open market under ordinary and usual circumstances, for cash, assum...
This rule has been
ing the owner is willing to sell and the purchaser willing to buy.
followed consistently. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Vail Associates, 171 Colo.
381, 468 P.2d 482 (1970); Mack v. Board of County Comm'rs, 152 Colo. 300, 381 P.2d 987
(1963); Williams v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 195, 363 P.2d 171 (1961); Board
of Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 184 P.2d 142 (1947).
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-115(c) (1973).
," In Western Slope Gas Co. v. Lake Eldora Corp., 512 P.2d 641, 644 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973), the court described these benefits to be those "which accrue directly to the residue
of the tract as a result of the construction of the improvement and which benefit directly
and particularly the specific tract . .. .
41 Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d
283 (1940).
41 Freel v. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 208 F. Supp. 93 (D. Colo. 1962); State v. Nicholl,
150 Colo. 84, 370 P.2d 888 (1962); Dandrea v. Board of County Comm'rs, 144 Colo..343,
356 P.2d 893 (1960); Mustang Reservoir Canal & Land Co. v. Hissman, 49 Colo. 308, 112
P. 800 (1910).
4" Big Five Mining Co. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 73 Colo. 545, 216 P. 719 (1923). See
also Fort v. Brighton Ditch Co., 79 Colo. 462, 246 P. 786 (1926).
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of the injured party's rights and feelings."" Unlike inverse condemnation, intent or lack of intent will influence the measure of
damages in a trespass action,50 although an unintentional trespass does not preclude exemplary damages.5
Trespass seems to offer the better remedy because the measure of damages is more flexible, exemplary damages can be
awarded, and benefits to the residue of the taken land cannot
automatically be set off against the damage to the remaining
portion. Under trespass, there is the further advantage of the
possibility of damages which will continue accruing even after the
commencement of the suit. As was pointed out by the appellate
court's decision in Ossman, in a trespass award "[n]o title to the
land taken or easement would result. ' 52 Thus, the injured
landowner may be able to maintain a succession of actions as the
damages from the original trespass accrued yearly or bring a trespass action and then force condemnation by the trespassing entity

53

49 COLO.

REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-21-102 (1973).

Trespass liability arises even if the trespasser does not "intend to invade the other's
interest in the exclusive possession of his land. The intention which is required to make
the actor liable . . . is an intention to enter upon the particular piece of land in question
.
...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163, comment b at 294 (1965).
51 See, e.g., Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co., 129 F. 668
(8th Cir. 1904).
11 511 P.2d at 520. In reversing the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court did
not deal with the question of whether title to the land passed or not. Instead it found only
that the lower court committed error in holding that a "landowner should be limited to
an inverse condemnation remedy" in this sitation. 520 P.2d at 741. Because trespass is
an action designed to redress the tortious "injury to the person, property, or rights of
another," it seems clear that trespass does not pass title. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 1 at 956
(1954).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161(1) (1965) states that "[a] trespass may be
committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure. . . which the actor has
tortiously placed there, whether or not the actor has the ability to remove it." The Reporter further adds that this "confers on the possessor of the land an option to maintain
a succession of actions .... " Id. § 161, comment b at 290. However, this statement is
modified by a later comment which notes that this "rule as to continuing trespass does
not apply if the possessor has been fully compensated by the actor for his tortious conduct
.... " Id. § 161, comment d at 290 (emphasis added). See also id. § 160, comment I at
287-88. The Restatement's position appears consonant with Colorado case law. See, e.g.,
Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Bennett, 61 Colo. 111, 156 P. 604 (1916). In Beetschen v. Shell
Pipeline Corp., 363 Mo. 751, 253 S.W.2d 785 (1952), cited with approval in Ossman, the
Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Restatement's position and noted that it would not
allow continuous trespass actions where the landowner had been fully compensated. Because a trespass award may fully compensate a landowner for a structure, such as a
telephone cable, tortiously placed on the land, he might not be able to maintain successive
trespass actions even though he still retains title to the land. See text accompanying notes
53-55 infra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

C.

VOL. 52

Which Remedy Should Be Elected?

Ultimately the election of remedies depends on the factual
setting of the appropriation. Trespass is clearly advantageous in
that it offers the possibility of exemplary damages and prevents
the setting off of benefits against damages to the residue. This
advantage, however, is minimal if the defendant has exhibited no
conduct warranting the award of exemplary damages and there
is either no benefit or no damage to the residue of the property
to be set off against each other. Similary, the more flexible measure of damages in trespass has little advantage over inverse condemnation damages if the difference in the value of the land
immediately before and immediately after the injury is the monetary equivalent of the fair market value of the land taken.
Finally, the advantages of trespass are illusory if the trespass
action is barred by either the sovereign immunity barrier, the
acquiescence of the landowner to the entry, or the running of the
statute of limitations.5 4 The choice of a common law remedy when
that action is barred for some reason may preclude recovery in
inverse condemnation as well. 5 5 Therefore, careful consideration
If, however, the Colorado courts would allow maintenance of continuous trespass
actions or a trespass action followed by ejectment or inverse condemnation, then trespass
would be clearly advantageous to the landowner because it would allow the landowner to
collect trespass, exemplary, and condemnation damages.
" See text accompanying notes 19-41 supra.
0 See, e.g., Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. See also cases cited note 41 supra.
There is also the possibility that collateral estoppel or res judicata will be asserted
by the appropriating entity if a trespass action is unsuccessfully brought by the landowner
who then attempts to relitigate the appropriation under an inverse condemnation theory.
In Waitkus v. Pomeroy, 517 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1973), the Colorado Supreme Court identified
the following tests as being determinative of whether res judicata as collateral estoppel
barred the relitigation of the issue:
First, was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Second, was there a final judgment on
the merits? Third, was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? And, fourth, did the
party against whom the plea is asserted have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior adjudication?
517 P.2d at 317, citing Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1945). See also Brennan v. Grover, 158 Colo. 66, 404 P.2d 544 (1965);
Murphy v. Northern Colo. Grain Co., 30 Colo. App. 21, 488 P.2d 103 (1971). Arguably
because the issue in trespass is whether there was a tortious entry on land and the issue
in inverse condemnation is whether there was an uncompensated condemnation of land,
collateral estoppel would not bar an inverse condemnation action by a landowner who had
proceeded unsuccessfully under a trespass theory. For a discussion of how a landowner
proceeding successfully under a trespass theory might be barred from recovery under
inverse condemnation, see discussion and authorities cited in note 53 supra.
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of the factual pattern in a particular appropriation is required
before an election is made.
Ossman
The effect of Ossman may well be to force entities endowed
with the power of eminent domain to promptly initiate condemnation proceedings and to strictly follow statutory requirements.
Before Ossman an entity that appropriated land could have
waited until the uncompensated landowner initiated inverse condemnation proceedings." It is to the advantage of the condemnor
to negotiate and attempt to settle out of court because in an
eminent domain action, even if promptly initiated, the condemnor is required to pay the landowner's litigation costs. 5
The ability of the landowner to now sue in trespass should
have the effect of forcing the appropriating body to commence a
condemnation action promptly. If it should refuse to do so, it
would be liable in trespass and be subject to possible exemplary
damages even though its entry on the land was unintentional and
in good faith.58 Because of the more generous measure of damages
and exemplary damages, a landowner would probably elect to
pursue trespass rather than inverse condemnation.59
A condemnor, even one already on the land, could begin
eminent domain proceedings by filing a condemnation petition
and thereby avoid trespass liability. 0 If the condemnor files this
petition, it is able to maintain possession of the property in question and all actions against it are stayed." Thus, a trespass action
III.

IMPACT OF

" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1-101 (1973) provides relief for a landowner whose
property has been taken in "all cases in which compensation is not made."
"7 Rullo v. Public Serv. Co., 163 Colo. 99, 428 P.2d 708 (1967); Denver Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d 283 (1940); Dolores No.
2 Land & Canal Co. v. Hartman, 17 Colo. 138, 29 P. 378 (1891).
-" This intent is not necessarily to trespass, but the intent to do the act that was a
trespass. Ansay v. Boecking-Berry Equip. Co., 450 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1971); Little Pittsburg Consol. Mining Co. v. Little Chief Consol. Mining Co., 11 Colo. 223, 17 P. 760 (1888);
Engler v. Hatch, 472 P.2d 680 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or Tors §
158 (1965). See note 50 supra.
5, See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
a COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-106 (1973).
" The statute provides that "upon the filing of the verified petition" contained in
section 38-1-102 (discussed in note 14 supra) and a deposit with the clerk of the court of
the amount the court in a preliminary hearing "determines to be proper compensation,"
the court shall authorize
the petitioner to take possession ..
and if already in possession to maintain
and keep such possession, and in all cases to use and enjoy such right-of-way
during the pendency and until the final conclusion of the condemnation
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commenced before the filing of the petition would be stayed until
the completion of the condemnation proceedings. The eminent
domain award, moreover, might remove the gravamen of the tort
claim. The taking of the land would in many cases be completely
compensated by the eminent domain award. The prompt initiation of the condemnation action by the filing of the petition might
2
possibly remove the grounds for exemplary damages.1
The impact of Ossman, then, would be to force the condemnor to follow statutory requirements rather than to delay action
by making the landowner take the initiative. By making trespass
available as an alternative, the Colorado Supreme Court is, in
effect, encouraging compliance with the present statutory
scheme.
CONCLUSION

Ossman raises many questions that will have to be answered
by subsequent litigation. It is not clear how closely the court will
limit this decision. If the court is simply reacting to the callous
treatment of Emett Ossman by Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co., then in the future it might not allow an election
where the appropriating body makes a greater effort to settle with
the landowner or at least promptly initiate condemnation proceedings.
In allowing the landowner to elect his remedy when his land
has been taken without compensation, the court has gone against
many of its earlier decisions. 3 The impact of this departure, however, may be lessened by future decisions and the fact that trespass, while offering many advantages to the landowner, is limited
by several barriers. In electing between trespass and inverse condemnations, these barriers as well as the advantages to tort recovery will have to be carefully weighed to determine which remedy
will provide the best relief for the injured landowner.
Charles P. Leder
proceedings, and the court shall stay all actions and proceedings against such
petitioner on account thereof.
Id. § 38-5-106.
62 Because the court in Ossman so closely links the conduct of the condemnor to both
the awarding of exemplary damages and the ability to elect trespass, it is possible that in
a situation in which exemplary damages are not awardable the landowner would be unable
to elect trespass as a remedy. For example, the court says that "Ossman had the right to
elect to sue in trespass under the circumstances here" and that "Ossman alleges conduct
which would justify an award of exemplary damages." 520 P.2d at 741 (emphasis added).
u Cases cited note 5 supra.

